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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the :Matter of the Estate 
of 
SAM N. l\fANATAKIS, sometimes 
known as Sam Manatakis, and as 
Sotiros N. Manatakis and as Sam 
Nekas, 
Deceased. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
No. 8534 
STATEl\1ENT OF THE CASE 
This is .an appeal by the Walker Bank and Trust 
Company, Administrator of the estate of the above 
named decedent, from a decree ordering the adminis-
trator to distribute the residue of the estate to Salt Lake 
County in trust and for the use and benefit of the Salt 
Lake County Hospital located .at 2033 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The above named decedent died on April 18, 1955 
at Salt Lake City, Utah and in his safety deposit box 
there was found two olographic Wills, one being undated 
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has been disregarded, and the one under which the decree 
was entered by the trial court reads rus follows: 
"February 26, 1954 
"WILL 
"All the money I have in my name Sam 
Manatakis or Sam N ekas I leave to the public 
hospital or County Hospital for the poor. 
(signed) SAM ~IANATAKIS - SAM NEKAS" 
There was no evidence offered at the hearing except 
a stipulation (R. 10-11) entered into by the parties to 
the effect that the records of the Salt Lake County Hos-
pital do not show that the decedent at any time was a 
patient at said hospital and that he died at St. Mark's 
Hospital. Pursuant to such stipulation and in consider-
ing said \Viii the trial court entered the judgment as 
aforesaid ordering distribution of the residue of said 
estate to Salt Lake County for the use and benefit of 
its hospital. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The evidence is insufficient to support the find-
ings of the Court that under the \Yill of said decedent 
Salt Lake County Hospital was na1ned as the sole bene-
ficiary of the estate of said decedent. 
2. The Findings and Conclusions are insufficient to 
support the decree that the residue of the estate of the 
decedent was left to Salt Lake County a body politic 
and corporate of the State of Utah, and be held in trust 
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for the use and benefit of the Salt Lake County Hospital 
located at 2033 South State Street, Salt L.ake City, Utah. 
3. The legatee named in the \Vill is indefinite, am-
biguous and uncertain, and the Will is therefore void for 
want of certainty. 
4. That the Will is indefinite, ambiguous and un-
certain in designating a leg.atee and in defining the object 
and use of the monies to be distributed. 
5. That Salt Lake County does not have power to 
receive testamentary dispositions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS 1, 2, 3 and 4 
EVIDENCE, FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE IN-
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE DECREE DISTRIBUTING 
THE RESIDUE OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE TO SALT LAKE 
COUNTY FOR THE USE AND BENEFIT OF SALT LAKE 
COUNTY HOSPITAL IN THAT SAID WILL DOES NOT 
DEFINITELY DESIGNATE A LEGATEE OR SUFFICIENT-
LY DEFINE THE OBJECT OF THE USE OF THE MONIES 
TO BE DISTRIBUTED. 
For the purpose of comparison decedent's \Vill is 
again set forth: 
"February 26, 1954 
"WILL 
"All the money I have in my name Sam 
l\i.anatakis or Sam N ekas I leave to the public 
hospital or County Hospital for the poor. 
(signed) SAM MANATAKIS - SAM NEKAS" 
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The trial judge in making and entering the court's 
findings and conclusions adjudged the Will to read as 
follows: 
WILL 
All the money I have in my name, Sam Mana-
takis or Sam N ekas, I leave to Salt Lake County, 
a body politic and corporate of the State of Utah, 
to be held in trust for the use and benefit of the 
Salt Lake County Hospital located at 2033 South 
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The main question to be considered is whether or not 
the decedent's Will clearly expresses the intention of the 
testator as to what person or persons are entitled to the 
distribution of the residue of his estate. In other words, 
did the trial court resort to speculation and conjecture 
in finding that Salt Lake County Hospital was the in-
tended sole legatee under the testator's Will. 
In Section 74-2-2 of Utah Code Annotated 1953, it 
is stated: 
"In case of uncertainty arising upon the face 
of a will as to the application of any of its provi-
sions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained 
from the words of the will, taking into view the 
circumstances under which it was made, exclu-
sive of his oral declarations." 
In Page on \Yills. Sec. 5±. the rule on certainty 
of a Will is stated as follows : 
"The intention of testator to 1nake testa-
ntentary disposition of his property, or to appoint 
an executor or a testamentary guardian, must be 
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expressed in such terms that the court can deter-
mine what was his wish without resort to conjec-
ture. Both the thing given .and the person to 
whom it is given 1nust, in testamentary disposi-
tion of property, be set forth with such certainty 
that the court can give effect to such gift when 
the estate is to be distributed. * * * 
The identity of the legatees must be reason-
ably certain. If the legatee can not be identified 
properly after considering the terms of the Will, 
the surrounding circumstances, and other admiss-
ible extrinsic evidence, the gift is void." 
In re Zilke's Estate, 1 Pac. 2nd 475, the Testator 
left an olographic Will which was duly admitted to pro-
bate and read as follows : 
"When I am dead I wont everyting to go to 
Offens home of San-Francisco. You find every-
ting in box 3608 I-Iumbolt Bank. This is my last 
Will. 
"M.arch 20, 1927. Edward J. A. Zilke." 
Upon a hearing of the Petition for Distribution the 
heirs at law and next of kin of the deceased claimed that 
they were entitled to the proceeds of the estate upon the 
ground that the Will was uncertain, and that the inten-
tion so ambiguous that the Will was void. The trial Court 
held that a number of orphan asylums situated in the 
City and County of San Francisco, seven in number, 
were entitled to the proceeds of the estate. 
The Court reversed the decree and stated: 
"If it appeared that there was no institution 
bearing the n.ame used in the will and that there 
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were seven institutions conducted as orphans' 
homes in San Francisco, a latent ambiguity arose, 
which ambiguity might have been removed by 
other evidence. In Taylor v. 1\'IcCowen, 154 Cal. 
798, the court at page 802, 99 P. 351, 353, quoted 
with approval the following language from Patch 
v. White, 117 U.S. 210, 6 S. Ct. 617, 710, 29 L. Ed. 
860: 'It is settled doctrine that, as a latent am-
biguity is only disclosed by extrinsic evidence, 
it may be rmnoved by extrinsic evidence. Such an 
ambiguity may arise upon a will, either when it 
names a person as the object of a gift, or .a thing 
as the subject of it, and there are two persons or 
things that answer the name or description; or 
* * *' No evidence was offered to remove the 
ambiguity in the present case, and we are com-
pelled to resort to the terms of the will alone in 
an effort to ascertain the intention of the testator. 
Civ. Code 1318. Under these circumstances, the 
question of the propriety of the decree is solely 
a question of law. Estate of Langdon, 129 Cal. 
451, 62 p. 73. 
"It is a statutorv rule of construction that 
'The words of a will a~e to be taken in their ordin-
ary and grmnmatic.al sense, unless a clear inten-
tion to use then1 in another sense can be collected, 
and that other can be ascertained.' (Ci-v. Code, 
1324.) If the will had provided that the estate 
should go to the orphans' 'hon1es' of San Fran-
ri~eo, we do not doubt that the decree entered 
would have been proper, assunring, of course, 
that respondents represented all of the institu-
tions falling in that elass. See Estate of Pearsons, 
113 Cal. 577, 45 P. 849, 106:2. and Estate of Pear-
~on~, 1:25 Cal. :2S5, 57 P. 1015. The will, however, 
provided that the estate should go to the orphans' 
'h01ne' of S.an Francisco. Counsel for respondents 
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state that 'The case turns solely on the importance 
of the omission of the letter 's' from the word 
"home",' and that such omission is 'frail ground 
indeed for the argument that the will should be 
invalidated and the charities deprived of the testa-
tor's intended benefaction.' But who can say from 
the terms of the will that the letter's' was not in-
tentionally omitted and that the testator did not 
have a particular home in mind as the recipient of 
his benefaction~ This appears to be quite prob-
able when we consider that the testator employed 
a capital letter at the beginning of the word 
'Offens,' which may be some indication that he 
was endeavoring to employ the name of some one 
institution. In any event he used the singular and 
not plural, and we are of the opinion that the lan-
guage used is insufficient to support a decree in 
favor of all orphans' homes or in favor of any 
particular orphans' home, in the absence of some 
evidence other than the will itself to show what the 
testator's intention was. The situation before us 
is much the s.ame as though the testator had pro-
vided in his will that his entire estate should go 
to his 'niece' and the court had distributed the 
estate to all of his 'nieces' solely upon the show-
ing that there was more than one person answer-
ing that description. In such case, it is clear that 
the decree could not stand. It is true as contended 
by respondents, that misspelling and grammati-
cal inaccuracies in a will are ordinarily of no 
consequence, but this rule is properly qualified 
in the citation quoted by respondents as follows: 
'Grammatical inaccuracies are immaterial, pro-
vided the intention appears * * *' 17 Am. & Eng. 
Ency. of Law ( 2d Ed.) p. 20. 
"It may be that the testator intended to leave 
his property in equal shares to all orphans' homes 
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in San Francisco as a class, or, on the other hand, 
it may be (and it appears more likely) that he 
intended a bequest to some particular orphans' 
home. Whatever his actual intention may have 
been, he failed to express it with reasonable cer-
tainty, and it is impossible to ascertain it from the 
will itself. Upon the record before us, the decree 
is based upon speculation and conjecture as to 
what his intention was. As was said in Estate of 
Hoytema, 180 Cal. 430, at page 432, 181 P. 645, 
'Courts are not permitted, in order to avoid .a 
conclusion of intestacy, to adopt a construction 
based on conjecture as to what the testator may 
have intended, although not expressed.' And 
again on page 433 of 180 Cal., 181 P. 645, 646, 
'Only through speculation and conjecture may the 
construction contended for by appellants be con-
firmed. And this can not be countenanced in view 
of the cardinal rule to the effect that in the inter-
pretation of wills it is not the probable intent 
which may have existed in the mind of the testa-
trix which prevails, but only that which is express-
ed in the language of the will.' 
"For the foregoing reasons, the portion of the 
decree appealed from is reversed." 
In re Hopes Estate, 98 A.6~~' the Testator be-
queathed a share of hi~ estate to any hospital in the city 
of Philadelphia that should be devoted to the treatment 
of contagious diseases for the purpose of endowing a 
ward therein, and provided a gift even if there be no such 
hospital at the ti1ne the legacy becan1e payable. 
Held: that the Testator intended a gift to a hos-
pital devoted to the treatment of contagious diseases and 
not a hospital containing a ward or isolation ward where 
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such diseases were incidentally treated, or to a hospital 
that was willing to establish such a ward for the treat-
ment of such diseases, and so, there being no hospital for 
the treatment of such diseases the gift failed. 
In Board of Trustees of M. E. Church v. May, 99 
A.1093, the bequest was as follows: "The remainder to 
be given to the Methodist E. Church, South, and Mis-
sionary Cause." This bequest was held indefinite and 
void as the words "and Missionary Cause" were too 
vague. 
In the Will under consideration there are several 
matters which render the Will void because of uncertain-
ty in the expression of the Testator's intention, namely: 
(1) The Testator fails to state the territorial loca-
tion of the public or county hospital that is referred to in 
his Will. It is only by conjecture and surmise that one 
can assume that the Testator's reference to the county 
hospital refers to the hospital conducted by Salt Lake 
County. There is no evidence that the Testator was ever 
treated in the Salt Lake County IIospital or that he 
expressed to anyone a desire to leave his money to the 
Salt Lake County llospital. 
(2) The Will is contradictory in that the attempted 
devise is in the .alternative, to-wit: "to the public hospital 
or County Hospital for the poor." Who can say with 
certainty from reading of the vVill that the Testator's 
chief intention was that the residue of his estate be dis-
tributed to St. Mark's Hospital or some other hospital 
outside of Salt Lake County, or the State of Utah. Let 
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us .assume that the Will read as follows: "I leave all 
my money to John Brown or William Brown." Who can 
say from construing the language of such a Will who is 
entitled to the distribution of the estate~ 
( 3) There is no evidence adduced before the Court 
that throws any light as to whom the Testator intended 
to leave his money as the name of the beneficiary is v.agne 
and uncertain, and the locality of the devisee lacking. 
( 4) To determine from reading the will that the 
decedent intended to give his estate to Salt Lake County 
for the poor it is necessary to read into the will the words 
"Salt Lake", which do not ,appear. Further, the will 
states that he leaves his money for the poor. The will 
is vague and ambiguous as to how it shall be used in 
helping and assisting the poor. 
POINT 5 
SALT LAKE COUNTY DOES NOT HAVE POWER TO 
RECEIVE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITIONS. 
It is generally recognized that the power to acquire 
a bequest or take a testamentary disposition of property 
depends upon the will of the Legislature. 
In Section 74-1-4 of Ftah Code Annotated 1953, it 
is stated: 
"WHO l\fAY TAKE UNDER 1VILL. -
A testamentary disposition may be n1ade to any 
person or corporation capable by law of taking 
the property so disposed of by deed or assignment 
or other transaction between living persons." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
The Legislature has provided that the agriculture 
college, Sec. 53-31-4 U.C.A. 1953; art institute, Sec. 64-2-
18 U.C.A. 1953; deaf and blind school, Sec. 64-3-2 U.C.A. 
1953; fair association, Sec. 64-4-1 U.C.A. 1953; nonprofit 
corporations, Sec. 16-6-8 U.C.A. 1953; state hospital, Sec. 
64-7-4 U.C.A. 1953; and state university, Sec. 53-30-3 
U.C.A. 1953 may take testamentary disposition of prop-
erty under a Will. Now here in the statutes of this State 
has a Legislature empowered a county to take property 
under a testamentary disposition. 
In 43 C.J. page 1337 it is stated: "It is a gener.al rule, 
however, that a municipal corporation cannot take and 
hold property in trust for a purpose which is foreign to 
the objects of its incorporation, and in which it has no 
interest." 
In Dailey v. New Haven, 22 A. 945, the Testator be-
queathed to the city $130,000.00 for the use of the poor. 
It was held that in the absence of authority granted by 
its charter a city had no power to accept the bequest in 
trust to apply towards income from furnishing necessities 
to the poor. 
Likewise in Au,gusta v. Walton, 1 S.E. 214, it was 
held that municipal authorities had no right under the 
laws of Georgia to accept or administer a trust for the 
benefit of the poor. 
The Legislature has not granted Salt Lake County 
any authority or power to accept benefits. Not having 
such power the County is not in .a position to accept the 
bequest or to administer the same. A lack of such power 
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forbids the County from seeking to enforce the testamen-
tary disposition in this case. 
The County will probably cite Section 17-5-44 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953 as an authority that the County 
has been granted power to receive testamentary bequests, 
which Section reads as follows : 
"They may receive from the United States 
or other sources, lands and other property grant-
ed or donated to the County for the purpose of 
aiding in the erection of County buildings, roads, 
bridges or for other specific purposes may use the 
same therefor, and may provide for sale of the 
same and the application of the proceeds thereof." 
The ,above statute refers specifically to donations, 
having in mind lands or buildings, roads or bridges, that 
may be donated by the United States or some other 
source to aid the County in carrying on its business. 
There is nothing in the statute referring to any testa-
mentary bequests. There is considerable difference be-
tween a donation and .a bequest. The donee may refuse a 
donation because it 1nay be a burden. For instance, the 
Count)~ may refuse a parcel of land that someone may 
want to donate to it upon the ground that the up-keep 
may be too burdensmne on the Uupayers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant sub1nits that the decedent's Will is 
indefinite and uncertain and should be declared void for 
uncertainty. Further, Salt Lake County does not have 
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power to receive testamentary dispositions. Therefore, 
the judgment of the trial court should be reversed and 
the monies in the estate be distributed to decedent's 
heirs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. G. METOS, 
Attorney for Appellant 
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